Episode Transcript
Speaker 0 00:00 <inaudible>.
Speaker 1 00:05 This is the annex, the sociology podcast. I'm Joseph Cohen from the City University of New York. Today we talked to Howard Ramos from Dalhousie University about the death of political parties. Our discussion was recorded on September 12th, 2019. A quick note, uh, over the course of discussion, we make several references to the GST. The value added tax that was established during the period in question. Uh, the GSD stands for the goods and services tax. Uh, we mangled it a bit, the goods and services tax. Now let's go to the episode
Speaker 0 00:46 <inaudible>.
Speaker 1 00:48 Last week, Michelle Goldberg wrote a piece in the opinion section of the New York Times titled,
Speaker 2 00:54 Dare we dream of the end of the GOP. And in it she describes a prediction for political pollsters, Stanley Greenberg, whose new book rip GOP, how the new America is dooming the Republicans predicts a blue title wave in 2020. And Kohlberg writes, it sounds almost messianic. The Republican Party not just defeated but destroyed. And my first impression with this is like, it's a fantasy, uh, these pieces that imagine the permanent death of political movements that we don't like. It's quite clear from this piece that Michelle Goldberg doesn't like the Republicans. And you know, I think there's some type of idea that Trump is so bad or demographic changes are so big that there'll be like a permanent and to the conservatism that prevents the types of policies that Goldberg in those who agree with her one. And this impression is rooted in my own experience in 1990s, Canadian politics when Canada's leading Conservative Party, the progressive conservatives was literally destroyed.
Speaker 2 01:59 It went from controlling the Canadian government to losing its official status as a party in one election. And it withered on the vine a few years and got swallowed up by a new form of conservatism. It wasn't really, it was the death of the National Progressive Conservative Party, but maybe not the death of conservatism. And, uh, the, you know, my, my impressions of this were naive and I thought, who better to explain this than Howard Ramos of Dalhousie University? Howard is a leading Canadian political sociologist. He's former president of the Canadian Sociological Association and a great mind to tap into this stuff. So thank you very much for joining us. Howard. Oh, my pleasure. Let's kind of you to say, Oh, it's the truth. Okay. So, wait, let's start. Let's do this like as a narrative story and start with the Progressive Conservative Party itself. Not specifically under Brian Mulrooney, the prime minister who sought death, but in general, what were the Conservatives about? How, what was their, what were their defining characteristics in your mind? Well, after
Speaker 3 03:00 World War Two, and, uh, the rise of the welfare state in Canada, conservatives realize that their only viable route to, uh, gaining any electoral attraction was to be progressive conservatives. And it's a tradition that, uh, is largely tied to my region. Atlantic, Canada, and people often call these folks Red Tories. And the recognition was that, uh, Canadians are very centrist. So if you're going to be, uh, a winning party, uh, to out flank, uh, the liberals, which is the dominant party, uh, the liberals are kind of equivalent to, uh, you know, if you look at Japan, uh, the Liberal Democrats or you look at Mexico, uh, the Pri, uh, you know, it's, it's the dominant party that that tends to, to win a lot of elections. And it does. So by kind of skirting the center, so the progressive conservatives were created in this way to try and play in that middle space.
Speaker 2 03:52 Now let's turn to Brian Mulrooney. Specifically. Mulrooney was prime minister from 1984 to 1993. To my mind, he was a very good prime minister, but ultimately he oversaw the destruction of his party. What did he do that got people so angry?
Speaker 3 04:07 Well, there were a number of things that he played with. So he was very much a center, a politician. If you looked at him in today's politics, he wouldn't look like a conservative, uh, at least in how the Conservatives have been rebuilt in Canada. Uh, he was invited to host, uh, well he was invited to a debate hosted by, uh, the national action, uh, committee, uh, on the status of women. So the National Women's organization hosted a debate with them. He was pro, uh, women's rights. Uh, he was open to free trade. He wasn't a nativist. Uh, what kind of did him in though was he was before his time. And so he offended, uh, mainstream Canadians, uh, in probably two ways. Uh, the first was, uh, an economic conservativism, uh, and openness to free trade. Uh, the second issue was at that time, uh, Canada had run, uh, almost two decades of deficits and, and the economy was largely defined by debt.
Speaker 3 05:03 And, uh, he was going to fix this by introducing a, a general service, uh, tax, uh, that was not popular at all. Uh, and then there's an interesting story to that too. Uh, and the other thing that kind of did him in was, uh, he was holding power at a time that Canada was revisiting its constitution in this kind of a band's period, uh, from 82 87, there was a period where the details of our constitution, which was Patriot in 1982, we're gonna get hammered out. And his lofty goal was to try and bring, come back into the constitution that didn't sign the constitution. And in doing so, recognize Cubex distinct society as a nation and English Canadians were not ready for that. Again, before his time today, I don't think most people would react so negatively. So he had built up this kind of, he was too progressive as a conservative, maybe a two in the center and, and ahead of his time.
Speaker 3 05:58 So, uh, when the election happened, it happened shortly after, um, the mutual lake accord fell. Uh, it also happened after a second accord, the Charlotte town accord fell, which were both of course to try and bring it back into the constitution and he lost his base of support and come back, uh, which were largely a number of conservative mps that jumped ship and formed the block cubic wall, which is a Quebec, a separatist party in the federal, um, uh, parliament or, and, uh, this was the undoing. Uh, and, and as you were saying, when the election happened in 1993, they went from having a majority down to just a number, a few numbers of seats under the, exactly, uh, uh, under the leadership of Kim Campbell who was really thrown in, uh, as, as many women are in politics into a dire situation. There's some excellent work by political scientist named Sylvia Bishop Kin, who analyzes women in politics and women leaders in Canada. And almost every time the narratives, the same, they get put into the position of leadership right at the time that the party looks like it's going to lose and they get held, you know, they get a bad deck of cards. And one could argue that that's what happened also with Hillary Clinton in, in the u s election in the last election, uh, that, uh, it was clear that the economy was, it wasn't, uh, doing well. She had a bad deck of cards. Um, and, and got put into this, uh, crazy election that happened in 2016.
Speaker 2 07:25 Yeah, we'll still wait. There's a lot to, I just want to sort of map it out there. So Mulrooney. So the, the big knocks on Mulrooney were one Canada faced a debt crisis and he raised taxes. He imposed a sales tax, like in national sales tax of about seven. Yeah.
Speaker 3 07:42 Well he didn't, he didn't bring it in. He proposed it. I ironically, the liberals who campaigned against him under xom crutch. Yeah. So they were never going to have this GST and, and um, you know, so it was like, no, we're not going to do this. And, and uh, you know, and then the very next thing they did was they brought it in.
Speaker 2 08:01 Yeah, of course. I mean, it was a, it was an excellent, and then the second thing he did, he, so he raised taxes in a way to deal with the debt problem and he proposed like sort of like a strongly multicultural
Speaker 3 08:13 sort of
Speaker 2 08:14 constitutional accord. Really. It was one that, uh, recognized Canada as our multicultural society rather than an English dominant one. And English Canada reacted very poorly to that.
Speaker 3 08:28 Oh, very much so. And then he also had the baggage of being in power for a number of years. And, and certainly as a, as you get into your second and third term, people, you end up campaigning against yourself as much as you campaign against others. So what's interesting about him is he was the leader of the concert, Progressive Conservative Party, but he wasn't conservative enough in terms of traditional values. And he was maybe too conservative in terms of economic values. He was open to world trade and globalization at a that Canadians weren't ready for that.
Speaker 2 08:57 Yeah, I think a lot of, uh, a lot of American listeners would find like a tax raising multiculturalists too. It's a, it's hard to imagine that that would be the conservative candidate, but he was like that and, uh, just a string of events caused them to be very unpopular. And then he mentioned Kim Campbell, so they appointed Mulrooney resigned quickly and they quickly appointed Canada's first female prime minister. I guess as the party had its head on the chopping block, they decided they'd stick her in there. If you ever hear a Canadian talk about how we've had a Canadian prime minister, I think that's worthy of an eye roll. Uh,
Speaker 3 09:37 yeah, she, she, she was farmer and she served as Canada's, uh, uh, in the consulate in La for a longer period than she was prime minister. So she was barely a prime minister, but at least we had a woman prime minister for a little while.
Speaker 2 09:52 Yeah, we've got like, we can check that box sort of with a big asterisk and then they got destroyed. What happened to, so from the view of the earlier article that I mentioned, you might imagine, oh, well that's the death of conservatism. Uh, the maybe the permanent death of the hated Progressive Conservative Party at the time. Uh, but it wasn't really the death of conservatism writ large was it?
Speaker 3 10:20 Well, it was the death of progressive conservativism. And what it did was it spawned, uh, you know, a, a decade and a half of a, a rebranding of conservativism. So what it did was it created, uh, the reform party, which was a further right of center conservative, largely based in, uh, the western provinces. And it, it created regionalism and, uh, basically very much like what's going on in the u s right now. It, it, it turned, uh, conservativism to focusing on a base rather than focusing on the broad network. And a number of years. Most of the rest of the 1990s and early two thousands was a struggle to try and unite the Conservatives to get the progressive conservative party to align with the reform party. There was a brief party called the Canadian Alliance, uh, which, uh, then got replaced by the Conservatives. So it was a, you know, a decade, decade and a half of trying to figure out what is the new coalition of conservatives and what it was, was basically focusing on, uh, social conservative and economic conservative coalition. Uh, and it got rid of the progressive.
Speaker 2 11:28 It's, you know, so I was actually an intern in the Progressive Conservative Party leaders office then under Joe Clark. Uh, and I remember, first of all, a funny side note, there were only two people who we had to wear a suit or we had to wear a suit to the office when two people came. One was Joe Clark, the former prime minister, and the other was Conrad black. Uh, <inaudible>. That's, I think he was bankrolling the party when it was shattered like that. He was, he was a fixture. I remember that. I mean, I was, I was young, I was a university student, so I wasn't privy to a lot of stuff. I just, you know, did research. But I remember that and found that quite funny. And I remember our impression was that it was an American style conservatism and that it was religious and nativist and uh, you know, sort of hard bargaining, not seeking a consensus. And you're saying it was like a base politics, a lot like the Trump Trump style of politics.
Speaker 3 12:27 Very much so. But what was interesting about this as a, it did solidify a base. It, it galvanized western Canada and a narrative of western alienation and the need to invest in the Alberta oil economy. But that alone wasn't able to rebuild the Conservative Party. So the party really got rebuilt in, in the two thousands under Stephen Harper prime minister. Uh, and it was rebuilt by, again, trying to move to the center, but it was center right. Rather than center left. And it was a focus on, on an economic conservatism. It catered to the religious right. But, uh, you know, try not to make too, too big a deal of that. Uh, and it catered to immigrants who are largely come to Canada through economic pathways and, and often, uh, are, are quite affluent. Uh, Eh, cause we have a very controlled, uh, immigration system. It's actually very hard to immigrate to Canada.
Speaker 2 13:24 Yeah. It's, it's a lot like the immigration system, I guess the Trump aspires to implement
Speaker 3 13:32 very much so. Very much so. And as a, an objective Canadian looking at some of the claims of Trump and before him, Obama, uh, you know, people often, uh, highlight the Trump, uh, you know, wants to build a wall and he wants to limit immigration. The only thing that is essentially different between him and Obama was a Poma wasn't going to build a wall and they really are trying to get, you know, the u s is trying to get a controlled immigration system, uh, which Australia has, which Canada has. And, and so Canadians often get smug and talk about how, how great we are about our immigration. But it's, you know, we have, you know, only one land border, which with the u s and, and three oceans. So we're not getting mass migration of undocumented people. And when we have a, our reaction hasn't been that different to what you see in an American reaction. Um, so we can say it's an interesting thing that the rebranding of conservatism was this kind of more central pack, uh, appeal to immigrants, new immigrants, um, appeal to globalization and, and, and yet, uh, economic, uh, cater to the religious right, but don't make that a centerpiece.
Speaker 2 14:39 You know, it's interesting, I guess in many ways you can understand contemporary republicanism to be in a similar position to where the reform party or conservatism was. Mulrooney. I mean, they had a mind, I mean, they were elected with a minority vote. It's just that the Americans have an odd system where a minority vote can still put you in power if it's, you know, concentrated in the right regions. Um, but I, I want to ask a question because I think underlying the, the, I, I've read these pieces about imagining the death of the GOP. And I think sometimes people imagine that if your political opponents have difficulty organizing and mounting and effective challenge, then it's just a clear runway for your policies. And I mean, I remember thinking for example, after Bush who I think probably did destroy the old Republican Party, um, there was a magic, there was some imagination that w, you know, Americans, we'd get socialized medicine and free highlight all of our socialist dreams would come true, but that was hardly the case. Like it, it, there's, there's still friction, right? You're, there's still people there. And did that happen in Canada too after the, the death of conservatism and Canada?
Speaker 3 15:55 Well, there was definitely a lot of friction. Um, ultimately the, the party that took over the Liberal Party ended up going center, right. Rather than center left. And the two liberal prime ministers that came after Mulrooney both governed in a very conservative fashion, um, bringing in a lot of policies that Mulrooney actually campaigned on. Um, which is the irony of it all. And, and what that ended up doing was it ended up reconfiguring what the center was to be central. Right. Uh, and it pushed the conservatives further, right. And I, it certainly created a, a decade, decade and a half of disarray. Uh, but again, when it was kind of a Phoenix rising out of the ashes for the conservatives, it was about trying to figure out how to regain that center. And right now, when I look at the Republicans with what has happened is they've lost their center. And you can see some, uh, Republicans.
Speaker 3 16:48 Uh, you know, the biggest sign to me is watching the number of Republicans weren't willing to run again. And this is, you know, very akin to what happened with Mulrooney. Uh, when, uh, Kim Campbell took over a number of the Mulrooney, uh, mps we're not going to run. And that's, that's the early signs that a, the coalition, uh, within the party is starting to evaporate. Uh, so, uh, you know, Trump may lose the next election and it may usher in, uh, you know, a two term presidency for the Democrats. Right. Um, but it also is on the side of the Democrats to take advantage of that. The recipe. And then the Canadian case was a prime minister that, um, kept the cards to the chest, uh, that, uh, recognized where the public was and didn't usher in radically left of center policies, but rather stay at the center and play the center.
Speaker 3 17:44 Right. Uh, so you know, that one of the interesting things that will come up with the next us election is how that will be navigated because there is a thirst for change. And I think most Americans, uh, recognize that, uh, Trump is not the, the person that necessarily would like to go to dinner with, uh, and are raising concerns on that front. Um, but they're also expressing that they don't necessarily feel comfortable with radical changes. And yet at the same time, you have young people who are demanding a change as well. So it, it's a hard recipe to play. So I don't envy any of the Democrats. Uh, whoever ends up becoming the Democratic candidate.
Speaker 2 18:25 This is a fascinating observation, nos. So following the destruction of conservatism, what the liberals tried to do was co-opt sort of the reconstitution of conservatism by moving themselves left. And you say Canadian politics as a whole took a slight tilt towards the right after a viable national right party was destroyed.
Speaker 3 18:51 Definitely. I'm Canadian politics. I've never gotten socially right in the post World War II period. Uh, but they certainly did go economically, right? A center. So balanced budgets were e platforms up until the last Canadian election. And it was quite radical a of Justin Trudeau to say that he was going to run on a, on a deficit budget. And everybody thought he was crazy, that this was an impossible way to win. Um, but what ended up being the, the undoing of the conservatives in the last election was a moving socially conservative. Uh, Canadians are quite comfortable with the economic conservatism, but, uh, when it comes to xenophobia or anti-immigrant sentiments, this is what has done in the Conservatives and, and is doing them in, in this current election that we're in right now. As you see a few splinter groups that have emerged, such as the People's Party, which is a splinter off of the Conservative Party, uh, to be more right wing than, than the Conservatives
Speaker 2 19:51 or nativists. But Canadian is, Canada's proportionally has a larger immigrant population, right? Compared to the Americans, 22 years,
Speaker 3 20:00 2% of Canadians are immigrants. Uh, and you know, almost 75, 80% of us are the children of immigrants or are married to immigrants. So it's such a big part of Canadian identity, uh, you know, unless you're indigenous urined immigrant in Canada, and so there's no winning route to, to um, xenophobia and nativism that excludes, um, interestingly, when there is kind of, uh, an anti immigrant sentiment, it looks much more like than other ones, uh, which is, uh, you know, we have to be concerned about immigrants because they might, uh, challenge our multicultural values or our liberal democratic values rather than having, you know, uh, values are, so it's not about the immigrant themselves. Is that issues around, uh, kind of, uh, the values. And you see that with Quebec and bill 21, which is a debate, uh, that that's being triggered there in terms of not being able to wear religious symbols if you hold, uh, a public position.
Speaker 2 21:03 So the Islamophobia basically is the one scene of phobia, sort of brand new scene, the phobia that gets some traction, is that what you're saying?
Speaker 3 21:11 Well, it's not clear cut Islamophobia. It's a, this kind of notion of prizing multiculturalism. So the end result is Islamophobia, but the construction of how you get there is a different construction
Speaker 2 21:28 and intro different from the way it's constructed in America, which I guess conceptually as a security risk or as a war or something like that.
Speaker 3 21:36 Exactly. So it's not about security, risk and war. It's much more, as I was saying, like the Netherlands, uh, which I think is a very appropriate example. If you look at a pimp opportun uh, who interestingly was a sociologist when, when he, uh, campaigned in an anti-Islamic, uh, platform, it was in defense of multiculturalism. Complete complete irony in, in, in argumentation.
Speaker 2 22:05 Yeah, I guess so if you assume you, I guess you assume that the left are the side that's welcoming to immigrants and is, you know, tolerant of other cultures or embraces diversity. But in and of itself that embracing of diversity creates a form of xenophobia and I guess intolerance. It's, I guess a testimony to how things are never easy. I mean, uh, are simple.
Speaker 3 22:31 No. And, and it also is a testament to how, uh, for any party or any political power, the way to maintain it as really to kind of navigate the center, not the extremes. And I think that what's interesting about our current moment around the world, uh, is that social media, uh, allows the extremes to have a wider voice than actually are present in the population. And, and something I've been wrestling with quite a bit these days is, um, the rule of supermajorities, uh, and how people aren't campaigning to with the super majority but are campaigning to their basis. And then again, uh, how people react to the basis rather than the super majority.
Speaker 2 23:13 So it's like a, this is sort of like a new generic political strategy that's catching on type of thing.
Speaker 3 23:20 It is, it seems that, you know, the last 10 years or so has been a kind of Sabermetrics, uh, big data, micro-targeting approach. If you can just hive off, you know, this little micro target group bit by bit, you can get just enough votes so that you can get your power and govern. Uh, but the end result is a, a very wobbly democracy in democratic and, uh, you know, and those who are on the left who kind of criticized as micro-targeting, uh, don't do themselves justice. Cause we often end up amplifying the very thing and giving voice to the very thing, uh, that we are worried about. So, you know, for example, with Trump, one of the best things that people on the left can do is just ignore him and talk past them. I often say to my students, uh, you know, remember that commercial with the Microsoft Guy and the apple guy and the Microsoft Guy was the old lame guy and the apple guy was the cool guy who got it. Well, that's the dynamic to really engage, uh, and appeal to that kind of super majority in the center is, you know, don't get dragged into it because, uh, the attention is what those fringe groups are looking for.
Speaker 2 24:33 Yeah. That reminds me of that. A New York Times piece from a few years ago by Louise and Gallis about how to deal with Berlusconi, Berlusconi. Silvio Berlusconi, prime minister of Italy, very much a Trump like figure, a media billionaire who was outrageous and provocative. And I remember him arguing. The basic gist of it was you have to treat them like a normal politician and argue on issues because so long as you, uh, engage him for his manner or his, you know, his does tastefulness stability, things like that. It's a losing game. Is that something you agree with?
Speaker 3 25:08 I, I completely agree with it. And, and I would even say don't even engage them. Talk past them. And, and, and, and you know, when you have the moment and the year of mainstream media, don't waste that 30 seconds by talking about, uh, him take that 30 seconds as an opportunity to state the values that you're for in, in a positive politic and, and, and eat up that time that he would get for his attention. So it's a very hard kind of dynamic. It's a very disciplined dynamic. But I think that people often forget in this age of social media that amplification is a power and that these fringe groups are looking for amplifications. So don't give it to them.
Speaker 2 25:48 We can, we got to go back to that. A Saber metric politics on another episode I'd love to talk about. We will with the two of us. We'll bring someone in, but I want to just finish up with the Canadian thing. So how did, uh, Stephen Harper, well, we talked about that, right? How Stephen Harper brought the country together a <inaudible> what did he do?
Speaker 3 26:08 Well, I wouldn't actually say the Stephen Harper brought the country together.
Speaker 2 26:12 TISM <inaudible>
Speaker 3 26:15 yes. So Stephen Harper was able to, to bring the Conservatives together and uh, with respect to the country, um, you know, the jury was always out with him. He ended up getting, uh, a, a minority government first, which is something you can have in Canada because we have a multi-party system. Uh, and he created a, a weak coalition. Um, but you know, he was basically on governing, on economic conservativism, uh, globalization world trade. And Canadians were comfortable with this and they could see the, the, the results. He also appealed to immigrants and created a base within the immigrant community. Um, he then got a majority, and with his majority, he started governing like a conservative. He moved away from the center that he had when he had this minority government. And at that point, uh, especially as some of the more social conservative values came in, Canadians didn't feel comfortable and, uh, very much, not so much Stephen Harper himself, but some of his ministers, uh, in the face of the refugee crisis during the election made some, uh, uh, audacious remarks and very callous remarks that really turned Canadians off of, uh, the Conservative Party.
Speaker 3 27:35 And then the end result was a majority government for Justin Trudeau, uh, which wasn't so much an endorsement for Trudeau, but just very much like a Harper, uh, was okay. You know, w we don't want the status quo. And so this is the election that we're currently in becomes really interesting to see what will end up happening here. Will the progressive, uh, vote splinter off, uh, because there were many progressive voters who voted for the Liberals, uh, just not to have, uh, Stephen Harper. And, and so this is the kind of thing that Americans can look forward to. Uh, post Trump. And you can already begin to see this, uh, debate happening with, uh, this huge field of primary candidates on the, on the democratic side that as an outsider is often hard to keep track of, but you can see a lot of variation there. You can see a Biden as being kind of the old establish a center, a candidate. You can see people like Camela Harris being a, uh, kind of, uh, you know, a little bit different but not too radical. You know, you have Warren also kind of in that middle, but a little bit more radical side. And then you have, you know, Bernie Sanders on the other extreme. And if the Democrats can sort of weave that all together, uh, they could have a viable alternative to, to Trump. If they can't, they'll splinter and voter turnout might be low and, and Trump might get a second term.
Speaker 2 29:02 So it's never a sure, but it's like you, you can't, so distaste for a politician is not a guarantee that that politician will be displaced. There's also, it's, it's never permanent. I'm gathering from your answer that like, even though the conservatism of Mulrooney really repelled people in the way that maybe they will react with Trump, people parties are smart and they adapt, they shed parts of their platform or their image and people forget or tensions lower and eventually people get tired of whoever's in power. And I guess it's sort of like under Obama. Yeah. After Bush there were two terms of Obama and Obama irritated people and Republicans found so well, it's an odd victory with Republicans, but they found some way to rebrand and engage. So it would you say, I guess it's sort of a, there's sort of a fantasy involved. Do you agree that there is some type of fantasy involved with imagining someone like Trump can permanently destroy republicanism or, uh, and do so in a way that like, it's going to be some type of liberal Utopian America, uh, after he's gone?
Speaker 3 30:18 I don't think it's a fantasy. I think it's, uh, but I, I think that it's a probability rather than a guarantee. Right? And I think that one of the things that's, uh, gives it a, a good probability is demographics. And if you look at the u s population that, uh, is increasingly Latino, uh, that's increasingly diverse, uh, that has a lot of young people and you look at how young people see the world, uh, they tend to be pro-environment. They tend to be more progressive in terms of the labor market and, and workers' rights. Um, it will take a lot to swing them conservative. Uh, so there's a window to try and appeal to that generation, uh, that if the Democrats can do that, can usher in a good chunk of time, that will force the Republicans to rebuild. Uh, you know, it could be a decade or so completely quashing them.
Speaker 3 31:09 That's probably not gonna happen, but it can usher usher in probably a decade or more. Um, if the, if the Democrats can reorient, and this is actually a really important thing to think about in terms of the reorientation of the conservatives in Canada as well, which is as the Liberal Party, uh, went central, right. Rather than center left. Uh, it created a generation of folks that got used to this level of center, which was more right of center than before. And, and, and so the long term longterm impact has been that Canada has become more right of center, uh, on economic issues. Uh, very few Canadians are against, uh, international trade at this point, whereas during Morini's years, Canada was not for that.
Speaker 2 31:55 Oh, it was red hot, controversial. Same with the GST. I remember people are so mad about the sales tax. I think that's really what did it meant was the proposal. Well then the reality of it though, it didn't sink crouching so
Speaker 3 32:09 well. It didn't seem crutch. And, and I think that what ended up happening is Krishna had a, a number of factors that went for him. Uh, you know, he was the every guy and he would call me and say, Oh, I'm just this guy from Shawinigan. Uh, but he also had 30 years of political power and was a, for lack of a better term, the henchman for pure Trudeau, uh, from the seventies through the eighties, given a lot of difficult portfolios. And, and what true, uh, Christian I realized is that, uh, the balance, you know, staying in power is a balancing game, eh, uh, of kind of staying in that middle reading how the winds blowing and Google middle right when the wind's blowing middle, right? Go middle left when it's going middle left. And, and, and having a kind of complex portfolio, a of policies and a country like Canada, which is regional and the u s is the same.
Speaker 3 33:03 It's a very regional country that you need to be able to kind of pull out in both directions. And I think this is the thing that's really been missing in the last 10 years is people forgot that you have to have a broad based coalition. And, uh, the last few elections in the U S and Canada, Europe, I've been these attempts to get your core base plus 5%, or we'll be a quarter plus plus 10%. And, and, and, and kind of, uh, see what happens. Uh, but you know, it's not the first time in us politics that the country is divided. You know, American politics is a history of divided politics right from the inception of the country. And I often remind my Canadian colleagues that, you know,
Speaker 4 33:45 okay,
Speaker 3 33:46 u s politics was branded by assassinations in the 1960s, uh, impeachment in the, in the 1970s, a pitchman impeachment in the, in the 1990s. There was never, ever a country that was filled full of centrus politics. Uh, there was always divisions and everybody's always questioning each other's patriotism on the campaign trail.
Speaker 1 34:06 Well, any of this, this was an amazing, say any last words or, uh, final thoughts before we, uh, we wrapped it up.
Speaker 3 34:13 Well, my, my final, yeah. The last things I would say to, to folks in the u s, uh, who are on the left is there's a huge opportunity ahead. Uh,
Speaker 4 34:24 okay,
Speaker 3 34:24 you can count anything for certain. Um, but the main thing to do is to really recognize that the way to go forward is not to, um, talk past people, but recognize kind of where they're at and try and see how you can build those connections, uh, can certainly, uh, going to the extreme hasn't helped them, uh, when the last election. Uh, and, and certainly the lesson you can take home from Canada is, uh, all the parties that have existed afterwards have kind of played that center space and, and the revival of the Conservatives here was being able to regain some kind of central coalition.
Speaker 1 35:03 And, uh, just before we leave, uh, Howard, if, uh, Howard is one of my favorite Canadian sociologists, a great political sociologist hired. If people are interested in working, they learn more about what you do.
Speaker 3 35:14 Uh, they can look at my website, which is Howard grandma's dot. ca.com. Dot Org. Dot. Everything, uh, as well as perceptions of change. Uh, dot. ca.org dot. Everything. So either of those two websites.
Speaker 1 35:26 Wonderful. That was Howard Ramos' of Daa Housing University. Thank you very much for joining us today. Oh, my pleasure. Thank you. You've been listening to the annex, a podcast, a special thank you to Howard Ramos of Dalhousie University. We're on the web socio <inaudible> dot org slash annex on Twitter at <inaudible> and on Facebook, the annex sociology podcast. Our producers are with Seth Merino, Jaylene Cologne and Fazio Mohammad. I'm Joe Cohen. Thanks for listening.
Speaker 0 36:01 <inaudible>.
